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NOTES AND COMMENTS
NOTE: MENTAL HYGIENE LAW-AN
ANALYSIS OF NON-COMPULSORY
ADMISSION PROCEDURE
Mental illness is a serious medical prob-
lem despite the attitude of those states which
treat it as a crime.' When mental illness
results in either an inability of the individual
to care for his needs or in antisocial conduct
directed at others, the problem takes on
social and legal significance;-' but it does not
lose its character as being essentially a medi-
cal problem.:' The function of mental health
laws is, therefore, to protect society's inter-
ests while the patient is being cured.
The mental health problem is significant
1 Barry v. Hall, 98 F.2d 222, 225 (D.C. Cir.
1938).
2 Ross, Commlitment Of the Mentally Ill: Prob-
lems of Law and Policy, 57 MICH. L. REv. 945,
954 (1959).
- OVERHOLSER, THE PSYCHIATRIST AND THE LAW
102 (1953).
because it affects so many people. In 1959,
it was estimated that eight million Amer-
icans were suffering from mental illness,'
and that half of the hospital beds in the
United States were occupied by mental
patients.' Because of these figures and be-
cause of the recent advances in the medical
approach to mental hygiene, such as the
introduction of tranquilizers in 1955,1 and
the current emphasis on patient coopera-
tion 7 it would appear that a re-evaluation
of our mental health laws is appropriate. In
4 Melaney, Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 12 U.
PITT. L. REV. 52, 71 (1960).
Ibid.; Willcox & Roemer, Hospitalization Under
the British Mental Health Act, 1959, 9 AM. J.
CoMP. L. 606 (1960); NATIONAL COMMITTEE
AGAINST MENTAL ILLNESS, WHAT ARE THE FACTS
ABOUT MENTAL ILLNESS 2 (1959).
6 SPECIAL COMMITrEE TO STUDY COMMITMENT
PROCEDURES OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF
THE CITY OF NEW YORK, MENTAL ILLNESS AND
DUE PROCESS 1 (1962) [hereinafter cited as
N.Y.C.B.A., MENTAL ILLNESS AND DUE PROCESS].
7 Id. at 56.
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1960, a Special Committee of the New
York City Bar Association [hereinafter re-
ferred to as the New York Committee],
undertook such a re-evaluation of the New
York Mental Hygiene Law. It issued thirty-
four recommendations as a result of its
two year study.8 It is the purpose of this
note to evaluate these recommendations, not
only in terms of the New York law with
which the Committee was concerned, but
also of mental health laws in general. The
object of this evaluation is to determine
whether there are workable solutions to the
mental health problem. Though the New
York Committee's recommendations dealt
with the non-compulsory, compulsory and
criminal admissions of patients into mental
hospitals, this discussion will be limited to
the non-compulsory admissions.
Before discussing those laws which are
applicable to non-compulsory admission, it
is necessary to set forth the objectives of
those laws. The goal of mental hygiene
laws is twofold: first, to treat the disease
medically in order to effect a cure; and
second, to view the disease as a disease
rather than a crime, in order to remove the
social stigma which attaches to mental ill-
ness. 9 While it is unquestionable that con-
siderations such as public safety and due
process must be manifested in such laws,
8 The Committee, composed of judges, doctors,
and lawyers working in cooperation with the
New York State Department of Mental Hygiene,
completed its study in January 1962 but incorpo-
rated judicial and legislative developments until
May 31, 1962 into its report. N.Y.C.B.A., op. cit.
supra note 6, at V-IX.
9 See Hoch, Commitment of Senile Aged to Men-
tal Hospitals, 139 N.Y.L.J. 4 (1958). Doctor
Hoch, Commissioner of Mental Hygiene of the
State of New York, said that "the stigma of the
mental hospital will never be removed, however,
if admission procedures continue to suggest crim-
inal procedures."
they should not be permitted to overshadow
the primary goal, that is, to treat the problem
as being basically medical. In spite of the
nature of the problem, one statute provides
that an alleged incompetent should be ar-
rested and given an immediate hearing on
the question of his competency. Pursuant to
this statute a sheriff arrested an alleged in-
competent and placed him in a jail, prior to
a hearing scheduled for the following morn-
ing. By such compliance with the statute,
his legal right to personal freedom was
preserved, but the prisoner hanged himself
during the night." The statute was inade-
quate, not on legal considerations, but
because it attempted to treat what is essen-
tially a disease as a crime rather than as
a disease.1
Non-compulsory admissions fall into two
basic categories: voluntary and informal.
The procedures for voluntary admission are
controlled by statute. In general, these
statutes establish requirements for the
patient's consent to a minimum period of
confinement in the hospital, 1" prescribe
procedures for admission" ' and create
standards for the patient's release."' The
'o Ross, supra note 2, at 959.
1' "The defects in the ordinary forms of judicial
procedure when applied to the determination of
mental illness are more widely recognized." Ross,
supra note 2, at 966.
12See, e.g., N.Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW § 71
(fifteen days).
13ALA. CODE tit. 43, § 207 (1915) (requiring
certification of commitment by a probate judge);
ALASKA COMP. LAWS. ANN. § 41-4-20C (Supp.
1958) (requiring application accompanied by
physician's certificate); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 36-502 (Supp. 1963) (requiring written peti-
tion).
14See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-187
(1960) (requiring written notice and ten day
maximum detention after receipt of notice); FLA.
informal admission, on the other hand, is
non-statutory. It is simply an open ward
policy, allowing for the free admittance of
patients who seek treatment and the im-
mediate release of those who wish to leave."2
A voluntary admission is essentially a
contract between the patient and the hos-
pital (or the patient and the state) whereby
the patient agrees to accept treatment. 16 A
problem arises in those states which require
a minimum period of detention in the hos-
pital after a request to leave has been made
by the patient.17 In this connection it must
be recognized that, though detention in a
mental institution is curative rather than
penal, it is no less an effective restraint on
personal liberty than a criminal imprison-
ment.Is Thus, while the primary goal of cure
is important, the requirements of due proc-
ess should not be forgotten. In Ex parte
Romero,19 the Supreme Court of New
Mexico held that a voluntary admission
statute, allowing the hospital to detain the
patient ten days after the receipt of a request
to leave, contravened the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment. 20 The rati-
onale of this decision was that if the patient
STAT. ANN. § 394.20 (1960) (immediate release);
MICH. STAT. ANN. § 14.809(1) (1956) (written
notice and five day maximum detention after
receipt of notice).
15 Willcox & Roemer, Hospitalization Under the
British Mental Health Act, 1959, 9 AM. J. COMP.
L. 606, 609-10 (1960); see, e.g., National Mental
Health Act. 1959, 7 & 8 Eliz. 2, c. 72 § 5.
I0 N.Y. Ops. ATr'Y GEN. 332, 334 (1923).
17 See, e.g., N.Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW § 71
(ten days); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-187
(1960) (ten days);MICH. STAT. ANN. § 14.809(1)
(1956) (five days).
18 Barry v. Hall, supra note 1, at 225.
1951 N.M. 201, 181 P.2d 811 (1947).
20 id. at 205, 181 P.2d at 815; see also Ex parte
Keddy, 105 Cal. App. 2d 215, 233 P.2d 159 (2d
Dist. 1951).
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were so ill as to require treatment in a men-
tal institution, his "contract" with the hos-
pital would be unenforceable. On the other
hand, if the patient were not so ill as to dis-
qualify his contract, there would appear to
be no reason for compelling him to remain
in the institution.
The New York statute provides for both
a "minimum stay" before a request will be
received and a ten day detention after its
receipt.21 The most important New York
authority which has considered the consti-
tutionality of its statute is an Opinion of
the Attorney General which advises that a
patient's rights are not invaded by compli-
ance with the statute. However, the opinion
did concede that the detention period was
based on a contractual relationship. 2
This apparent conflict between New
Mexico and New York is resolved to some
extent by the fact that although the court
in Romero declared a ten day statutory de-
tention period to be unconstitutional it also
indicated that a reasonable detention period
would be acceptable. The court defined
reasonable detention as the holding of a
person temporarily until legal proceedings
could be commenced to determine whether
the patient is dangerous to himself or to
others. 2' The Romero approach seems to
have been adopted in many other jurisdic-
tions whose more recent statutes provide for
21 "In the discretion of the director of the hospital,
facility or institution, such person may be detained
for a period not exceeding fifteen days for the
purpose of such care and treatment and thereafter
until ten days after receipt of notice in writing
from such person of his intention or desire to
leave...." N.Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW § 71.
22 N.Y. Ops. ATr'y GEN., op. cit. supra note 16.
23 The court indicated that in this particular case
two days would not be an unreasonable period in
which to institute commitment procedures. Ex
parte Romero, supra note 19, at 206, 181 P.2d
at 815.
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a short detention period2 4 These detention
periods are qualified by the fact that the
patient may only be detained for the purpose
of instituting commitment proceedings. 25
The contractual detention period found
in the New York statute appears to be
contrary to the majority approach in that
the detention is unqualified.26 Although the
New York Committee made no recommen-
dations in this area, the statute of that state
would appear to have two defects. The first
defect, as already indicated, lies in the fact
that the statute may be assailable on con-
stitutional grounds. The second defect in-
volves the fact that patients may be deterred
from applying for voluntary admission if
they know they must surrender their free-
dom for a given length of time.27 Thus, a
"voluntary admissions" statute, designed
mainly to encourage voluntary admissions,
would appear to be self-defeating because
of this deterrent.
Statutes providing for a "minimum stay"
should not be dismissed, however, as pro-
viding no benefits. While a statute allowing
release at any time has the advantage of
encouraging participation, it also may have
the disadvantage of allowing the patient to
leave before a cure can be effected and
perhaps even before his illness can be fully
24See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 71-1-2
(Supp. 1957) (five days); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 394.20 (1960) (hours); MICH. STAT. ANN.
§ 14.809 (1) (1956) (five days); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 202.790 (1959) (48 hours).
25 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.20(3) (1960);
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 202.790 (1959); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 25-03-06 (1960); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 64-7-31 (1953).
26 N.Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW § 71.
27 Wilcox & Roemer, Hospitalization Under the
British Health Act, 1959, 9 AM. I. CoMp. L. 606,
609-10 (1960); Ross, Hospitalization of the Vol-
untary Mental Patient, 53 MIcH. L. REV. 353, 374
(1955).
diagnosed.2 8 This disadvantage can be miti-
gated to some extent by a provision in the
applicable statute allowing for the institu-
tion of commitment proceedings, but it can-
not be completely eliminated. Although
such a "minimum stay" provision can
guarantee no greater possibility of cure, it
may enable diagnosis to be completed.2 9
Nevertheless, it would appear that the
Romero approach is superior since it pro-
vides greater protection for the mentally
incompetent by encouraging more extensive
participation in the voluntary programs.
Although the voluntary admission proc-
ess is beneficial in theory, it cannot func-
tion without carefully drafted entrance
procedures. In this regard, the New York
Committee has advocated simplicity. 0 The
procedure now approved by the Committee,
requires only that the patient sign the nec-
essary admission forms with an awareness
and appreciation of what he is doing. This
simple procedure is in sharp contrast to
the Alabama procedure which requires that
"no patient shall be received.. .who is not
presented with a certificate from a proper
court committing him to the institution." 31
The involved requirements of this statute, in
effect since 1915, would represent a sub-
stantial deterrent to the mentally ill person
who might desire to seek treatment. The
less complicated procedure recommended
28 Ross, supra note 27, at 374 (1955); cf. Note,
Analysis of Legal and Medical Considerations in
the Commitment of the Mentally Il, 56 YALE
L.J. 1178, 1201 (1947).
29 "Either the period is too short for effective
treatment, or it is so long that it discourages use
of voluntary admission." Ross, supra note 27,
at 380.
30 N.Y.C.B.A., MENTAL ILLNESS AND DUE PROC-
ESS 23 (1962).
31 ALA. CODE tit. 45, § 207 (1959) (This statute
was originally enacted September 25, 1915).
by the Committee would appear to be more
in keeping with the primary goal of treating
the disease. Statutes such as Alabama's,
which have the added defect of socially
stigmatizing the patient as having been
"committed to the institution by a court,"
should be revised to encourage the mentally
ill to seek help.3
2
The discharge provisions under voluntary
admissions are generally the same in all
jurisdictions, at least with regard to one
aspect. They provide that when the doctor
in charge of the hospital is of the opinion
that the patient has sufficiently recovered,
the patient is to be discharged from the
hospital.3" The statutes, however, differ in
their methods of release after the patient
submits a request to leave.'
The form of the request itself presents
difficulties. Some states require that the re-
quest be in writing,33 while others would ac-
cept an oral request.3 ; The dangers inherent
in a "written request" procedure are best
illustrated in the Connecticut approach. The
32 N.Y.C.B.A., MENTAL ILLNESS AND DUE PROC-
ESS 24 (1962); Melaney, Commitment of the
Mentally Ill, 12 U. PITT. L. REV. 52, 60 (1960).
1: See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 202.787 (1959);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 64-7-30 (1953).
34 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-187
(1960) (written notice with ten day detention
period thereafter); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 911 , § 4-2
(Supp. 1960) (detention for 30 days after written
notice in a first or second voluntary admission,
after third or fourth admission, patient can't give
30 day notice until committed for 90 days, after
fifth or later admission not until after 6 months);
MD. ANN. CODE art. 59, § 37 (1957) (detention
for 3 days after written notice). Some states have
no release provisions. Ross, supra note 27, at 381.
35 See, e.g., N.Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW § 71;
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-504(b) (Supp. 1963);
MICH. STAT. ANN. § 14.809(l) (1956).
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.20 (1960);
MO. STAT. § 202.790 (1959); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 64-7-31 (1953).
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pertinent statute of that state provides for
no minimum detention period; there is how-
ever, a maximum ten day detention sub-
sequent to the patient's written request to
leave.-7 In Roberts v. Paine, s a voluntary
patient in a Connecticut institution orally
requested his release. The request was de-
nied but the hospital did not disclose to the
patient that the only ground for the denial
was his failure to submit the request in
writing. Later, on the advice of counsel, the
patient submitted his request in writing and
was duly released. The former patient sub-
sequently brought an action for false im-
prisonment but the highest court of the
state rejected the plaintiff's claim. The court
held that there was no duty on the part of
the hospital to disclose a fact which was
ascertainable by both parties. : 1
The inequity of this case is quite evident.
The mental patient under a voluntary ad-
mission system has only two means of secur-
ing his release: (1) he may comply with
the statute and submit a written request, 40
or (2) he may petition for a writ of habeas
corpus on the ground that the detention
statute is unconstitutional.4' However, either
of the aforementioned means would require
the mentally ill person to recognize that
there existed some legal solution to his
problem."" It has been pointed out that the
37 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-187 (1960).
3s124 Conn. 170, 199 Atl. 112 (1938).
Id. at 175-76, 199 AtI. at 115.
" Roberts v. Paine, 124 Conn. 170, 199 AtI. 112
(1938).
41 Ex parte Romero, 51 N.M. 201, 181 P.2d 811
(1947).
' "One of the findings of the committee's staff is
that some voluntary patients are not aware of
their right to ask for discharge. This is under-
standable, considering the atmosphere of compul-
sion that has surrounded hospitalization of the
mentally ill for many decades." N.Y.C.B.A.,
MENTAL ILLNESS AND DUE PROCESS 29 (1962).
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disadvantage of such a requirement is the
possibility that a patient might suffer trau-
matic effects from the prolonged incarcera-
tion before discovering that such a remedy
existed. 3 The only other protection afforded
such a patient is his right to redress his in-
juries by bringing an action for false im-
prisonment. However, such a decision, as
that rendered in the Roberts case, would
appear to eliminate that protection from un-
reasonable restraint by the hospital.
To remedy the wrongs created by such
situations, the New York Committee has
advanced the following two recommenda-
tions. First, a patient would be given notice
of his status and rights as a voluntary
patient."' This notice would be given to a
patient when he entered the hospital and
periodically thereafter. 4 5 It would provide
the requisite knowledge to one who would
otherwise be unaware of his legal rights and
would also help one who had forgotten his
status or rights after undergoing electric
shock therapy."; Second, the Committee
43 "Administrative procedures should be so organ-
ized as to have minimum psychic traumatization."
Recommendation of the Group for Advancement
of Psychiatry cited in Melaney, supra note 32,
at 60.
4t N.Y.C.B.A., MENTAL ILLNESS AND DUE
PROCESS 29-30 (1962): "[U]nless the patient is in-
formed of his right to request release and is as-
sisted in making his request, the right of release on
notice may have no real meaning." Ross, Hos-
pitalization of the Voluntary Patient, 53 MiC. L.
REV. 353, 377 (1955).
45 Ross, Hospitalization of the Voluntary Patient,
supra note 44.
46 N.Y.C.B.A., MENTAL ILLNESS AND DUE PROC-
ESS 29 (1962); A similar problem may be created
by the use of tranquilizers. "[T]ranquilizers may
reach the very source of the will to resist. Since
a patient who has been admitted to a mental hos-
pital may not be in a position to object to his
continued detention because of the nature of his
illness or the initial steps in its treatment, his
rights must be protected as fully as those of the
patient who voices his protest." Id. at 26.
recommended the establishment of a "Men-
tal Health Review Service" which, as an
independent organization under state aus-
pices, would insure that the periodic notice
would be given to the voluntary patient. 47
Such a proposal for an independent organi-
zation appears to be modeled after the Brit-
ish "Mental Health Tribunals."' s Both are
to be staffed by persons generally labeled as
"qualified," ' and both are designed to pro-
tect the legal rights of the mentally ill. There
can be little doubt that such an organization
would be of great assistance in protecting
the patient's legal interests; it might also
prove effective in encouraging participation
in a voluntary program.5 0
Not all jurisdictions require a voluntary
patient to request his own release. Some
statutes permit a patient to be released on
the request of another, but only if the patient
consents to such release. 1 When a patient
47 Recommendation No. 1. Id. at 29-30.
48 See, e.g., Willcox & Roemer, Hospitalization
Under the British Mental Health Act, 1959, 9 AM.
J. COMp. L. 606, 622-23 (1960).
Il Neither the recommendations nor the British
system establish the qualifications of the members
with certitude. Under the New York Committee's
recommendations the Service would be "staffed
by those trained for this work." N.Y.C.B.A.,
MENTAL ILLNESS AND DUE PROCESS 21 (1962).
Under the British system the tribunal is composed
"of 'legal members' (one of whom is chairman),
of doctors, and of persons specially qualified in
administrative or social service or otherwise."
Willcox & Roemer, suipra note 48, at 623.
50 One possible problem concerning hospital ad-
ministration has been raised, however. Thus, it
has been pointed out: "While in principle the
enumeration of patient's rights may be objection-
able as impinging upon the executive authority of
the hospital administration, in practice they prob-
ably do not disrupt administration and in the main
reflect the present standards of care in our better
run mental hospitals." Ross, Hospitalization of
the Voluntary Mental Patient, 53 Mici. L. REV.
353, 361 (1955).
51 See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 202.790 (1962);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 64-7-31 (1953).
is under the legal age the request for his
release must be made by a parent or
guardian.5 2
The second type of non-compulsory
admissions, the informal admission, is de-
signed to encourage maximum patient par-
ticipation by permitting him to freely enter
and leave the hospital. Experience demon-
strates that such a program is highly effec-
tive in practice. For example, St. Lawrence
State Hospital, the only New York hospital
to have all of its patients on an open ward
system, had the highest percentage of non-
compulsory patient population in the state.2
England, in a complete revision of its mental
health laws in 1959,54 rejected the use of
any voluntary or statutory non-compulsory
admissions. 5 In its place England substi-
tuted the informal admissions.5 6 This system
provides an atmosphere which is most con-
ducive to caring for the patient by inducing
full patient cooperation.57 It has the added
virtue of eliminating all formalism which in
52See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.20 (1960);
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 202.790 (1959).
52That hospital with 100% open wards had
56.3% of its patients on a voluntary status,
whereas New York state hospitals in general, with
63.4% open wards had only 21.3% of their
patients on a voluntary status. N.Y.C.B.A., MEN-
TAL ILLNESS AND DUE PROCESS 262 (1962).
54 National Mental Health Act, 1959, 7 & 8 Eliz.
2, c. 72.
55Willcox & Roemer, supra note 48, at 611
(citing the Royal Commission's Report).
56 Melaney, supra note 32.
57 WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, HOSPITALIZA-
TION OF MENTAL PATIENTS, A SURVEY OF EXIST-
ING LEGISLATION 15 (1955); NATIONAL INSTITUTE
OF MENTAL HEALTH, FEDERAL SECURITY AGENCY,
A DRAFT ACT GOVERNING HOSPITALIZATION OF
THE MENTALLY ILL (Public Health Service Pub.
No. 51, rev. ed. 1952). "A fully operating pro-
gram of voluntary admissions will reduce ma-
terially the harmful experiences often associated
with compulsory hospitalization and at the same
time encourage the mentally ill and their families
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turn reduces the social stigma attached to
"commitment." The result of the British in-
novation has been dramatic. In England,
seventy-five per cent of all admissions are
now non-compulsory, and in Wales, also
governed by the new statute, ninety per cent
of all admissions are informal."'
There are three reasons why the Royal
Commission rejected voluntary admission
statutes. First, there would be no contractual
relationship in the informal system, hence
no need to determine the patient's capacity
to contract.5 9 Second, as previously indi-
cated, the informal system eliminates the
technicalities of voluntary admissions; 60 and
finally, experience indicated that the in-
formal system encourages the greatest pa-
tient participation.6
The New York Committee has endorsed
the use of informal admissions62 and this
procedure has since been adopted.6 3 How-
ever, it has also continued its endorsement
of the voluntary system.6 4 While the two
systems are not mutually exclusive, it seems
unnecessary to have both. Perhaps the New
York Committee should have chosen the
informal system, and recommended its use
exclusively, since it has proven to be the
better system.
to obtain care at an early stage, when the promise
of recovery is greatest." part I!!, 19.
58 Willcox & Roemer, Hospitalization Under the
British Mental Health Act, 1959, 9 AM. J. CoMP.
L. 606, 609-10 (1960).
591d. at 611.
60 Melaney, Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 21
U. PITT. L. REV. 52-60 (1960) (recommendations
1-3).
61 N.Y.C.B.A., MENTAL ILLNESS AND DUE PROC-
ESs 278 (1962).
62 Id. at 30 (recommendation I t).
63 N.Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW § 71 (Supp.
1963).
64 See, e.g., Recommendations 9-10, 12, N.Y.C.
B.A., MENTAL ILLNESS AND DUE PROCESS 28-31;
textual treatment at 54-82.
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The British system would seem to elimi-
nate all of the previously discussed objec-
tions to voluntary programs. It encourages
the earliest 5 and greatest patient participa-
tion, and the treatment of the disease as a
disease by eliminating the formalism ac-
companying voluntary admissions. It elim-
inates the Romero problem since there is
no contractual relationship, no "minimum
stay" requirement, and no maximum un-
qualified detention period after a release
request. It also obviates the problems of
notice such as the Roberts situation since
the patient may leave at any time. 6
The only problem not eliminated by the
informal admission itself, namely that posed
by a patient who was unaware that he
could leave or a patient who lost this aware-
ness through shock therapy, would be allevi-
ated by other facets of the British system.
That system applies the same solution which
was suggested by the New York Committee
- namely, a review service or tribunal to
protect the rights of the patients and to en-
sure adequate notice to the patient.
6 7
Both the informal admission6 s and the
voluntary admission69 generally have a con-
version feature, that is, a statutory provi-
sion which would allow the chief medical
officer or doctor in charge of the hospital to
petition a court to convert the non-compul-
sory status of a patient to a compulsory
status. Such conversion is authorized only
when a patient is dangerous to himself or to
others,"0 and then only after a patient has
65 Willcox & Roemer, supra note 58 at 610.
66 Id. at 609.
17 Id. at 620-23.
68 National Mental Health Act, 1959, 7 & 8 Eliz.
2, c.72 § 30.
69 See, e.g., ARz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-504(b)
(Supp. 1963); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.20 (1960).
70See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.20 (1960);
requested his release. 7" The states have
varying requirements as to the time during
which the hospital may detain the patient
pending the institution of proceedings to
convert his status.12 The cases generally hold
that a patient may be detained for a reason-
able time in such circumstances.7 3 These
conversion features would probably not
deter any patient from availing himself of
the non-compulsory admission, since the
patient would either believe that he is not
dangerous and therefore not apt to have his
status converted, or recognize that he is
dangerous and, desiring treatment, not re-
quest release.
Although this conversion feature is nec-
essary, there is at least one deterrent to a
patient's voluntary submission to treatment.
Some statutes provide for the sterilization
of patients if in the opinion of the hospital
such sterilization would be for the benefit of
society.7' The "benefit" sought is the preven-
tion of the spread of inheritable mental
disease. 7, The Supreme Court of the United
States, in 1927, held that this practice was
not unconstitutional. 7 6 Although such a de-
cision may be questioned in the light of
Mo. STAT. ANN. § 202.790 (1959); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 25-03-06 (1960); UTAH CODE ANN. § 64-
7-31 (1953).
71 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.20 (1960);
MO. STAT. ANN. § 202.790 (1959).
72 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.20 (1960)
(hours); COLO. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 71-1-2 (Supp.
1957) (five days); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 14.809(1)
(1956) (five days); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 202.790
(1959) (48 hours).
73 See, e.g., Ex parte Keddy, 105 Cal. App. 2d 215,
233 P.2d 159 (1951); Ex parte Romero, 51 N.M.
201,181 P.2d 811 (1947).
74 See, e.g., MICH. STAT. ANN. C. 115 (1956);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 64-10-1 (1953).
75See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-531
(1956); VA. CODE ANN. tit. 37, § 231 (1950).
76 Buck v. Bell 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
modern medical advances77 and natural law
norms, 8 a more detailed analysis is beyond
the scope of this note.
While initially it would seem that a
patient would be reluctant to submit to a
commitment program which might subject
him to such drastic measures, statistical
facts do not necessarily bear this out.
Although some states having sterilization
statutes have the lowest admissions per
capita (on a percentage basis) in the United
States, 79 Delaware, which also has a sterili-
zation statute,s0 has one of the highest ad-
mission rates.," The Delaware anomaly may
be explained in a number of ways: (1) the
statute may not be widely known, (2) the
statute may not be widely used or (3) most
admissions may be on a compulsory basis.s2
77 See generally OVERHOLSER, THE PSYCHIATRIST
AND THE LAW 102 (1953).
7s FAGOTHEY, RIGHT AND REASON 302-05 (2d ed.
1959); AQUINAS, SUM MA THEOLOGICA I1-I, q. 65,
art. 1.
7:The following chart delineates the lowest and
the highest admissions in the country, measured
by the number of patients per hundred thousand
civilian persons in each state.
Rate per
State 100,000
Mich. 36.8
Utah. 45.3
Mo. 47.9
Fla. 48.2
Mass. 140.5
Del. 141.5
N.D. 149.7
U.S. Statistical Abstract 26 (1963). Michigan and
Utah, the two states having the lowest admissions
both have sterilization statutes. MICH. STAT. ANN.
c. 115 (1956); UTAH CODE ANN. § 64-10-1
(1953).
80 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16 §§ 5701-05 (1953).
SI See chart, supra note 79.
8 These figures in note 79 supra, are not broken
down into voluntary, informal or compulsory ad-
missions.
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It would appear, however, that the existence
of such a statute would present a deterrent
to a potential patient who knows of its
existence.
Under a voluntary admissions statute the
patient has no greater rights than the com-
pulsory patient."1 Though the informally ad-
mitted patient does have greater rights, in
the following three areas he does not.
First, the patient's mail is frequently sub-
ject to censorship,s4 but statutes normally
provide a class of persons to whom the
mental patient may send uncensored mail."'
In New York, however, the statute did not
include the patient's attorney as a person to
whom mail might be freely directed. In
spite of this omission, the Court of Appeals,
in Hoff v. State, ' found New York liable
for damages to a patient whose letter con-
taining a petition for habeas corpus was
never forwarded to his attorney. It would
appear that the main purpose of the censor-
ship statutes is to protect the public from
indiscriminate mailings by the mentally ill
rather than to limit the rights of the patient.
s8 "The New York statute ... implies ... that hos-
pitalization does result in incompetency." Ross,
Hospitalization of the Volmtary Mental Patient,
53 MiCH. L. REV. 353, 367 (1955). Professor
Wigmore suggests that commitment should only
be of evidentiary value in determining incom-
petency. 5. WIGNIORE, EVIDENCE §1671 (3d ed.
1940).
s See generally Ross, supra note 83, at 362.
85 See, e.g., General Order 26, Correspondence of
Patients, N.Y. Mental Hygiene Dep't, an adminis-
trative regulation, which provides that "the hos-
pital director [may] . . . prevent the transmission
of outgoing mail that is obscene, profane, illegible,
incoherent, or otherwise objectionable. All letters
addressed to the Governor, certain public officials,
judges, lawyers, and certain officers of the De-
partment of Mental Hygiene must be forwarded
at once and without examination, and all mail in
reply must be delivered to the patient."
-i 279 N.Y. 490, 18 N.E.2d 671 (1939).
NOTES AND COMMENTS
Also, the courts have demonstrated a will-
ingness to protect the patient's right of free
speech in matters concerning his status as
a patient.8 7
The Committee makes no specific recom-
mendation in regard to censorship but pre-
sumably a patient's rights would further be
protected by including the Mental Health
Service Review in the list of privileged ad-
dressees."5 This is an area where the public
interest should be balanced against the pri-
vate interest, and there is unfortunately no
definite solution provided by either the vol-
untary or the informal system.
Second, the New York Committee spe-
cifically discusses the right to drive and the
right to vote. Naturally, the former could be
exercised only during a period of out-patient
care. The New York Motor Vehicle Bureau
would look to the nature of the illness, so
that if a patient's mental illness would not
interfere with his ability to drive, no restric-
tions would be placed upon him.,- The New
87 Ibid. See also, Jacobs v. Worthington, 167 Misc.
702, 4 N.Y.S.2d 630 (Sup. Ct. 1938). For the
opinion that patients should have free access to
communication facilities see the testimony of Dr.
Ewalt for the American Psychiatric Association.
Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 1st Sess.,
pt. 1, at 75 (1961).
8s "[T]he Service ... will be available to aid vol-
untary patients who ask for its help." N.Y.C.B.A.,
MENTAL ILLNESS AND DUE PROCESS 21 (1961)
(recommendation 1).
s" "The Department of Motor Vehicles has never
suspended or revoked a license merely because of
the certification of the holder to a mental hospital.
Under an informal agreement between the Com-
missioner of Motor Vehicles and the Department
of Mental Hygiene, the director of a state hospital
notifies the Commissioner in writing at the time
of the patient's release if the hospital believes the
patient not fit to drive. The license is then sus-
pended, and the person is entitled to a hearing on
the suspension. He may obtain a court review of
York Committee approves of this procedure
since it is a practical approach to the prob-
lem."I However, the nature of the disease
has no bearing on the patient's right to vote
under current New York law. Voluntary
and informal patients may exercise this
right; compulsory patients may not."' Al-
though it may be argued that a procedure
which would look to the nature of the illness
protects the interests of society, it has been
stated that a procedure which would look
to the nature of the admission would en-
courage patient participation in the volun-
tary admissions program. Again the problem
is one of balancing public and private
interests.
It seems more reasonable to base voting
and driving rights on the nature of the illness
rather than on the type of admission since
society is entitled to equal protection in
both areas. Of course it could be argued
that under such a system doctors would be
given the power to decide who may vote and
who may not and that such a power might
easily be abused. On the other hand, is the
voluntary patient necessarily more compe-
tent than the compulsory patient? '2 Finally,
if the incompetent can relinquish some of
his liberties by contract, he should be able
to do the same as far as his voting rights
are concerned. Both sections of such a con-
tract should be equally binding.'"
the decision to revoke his license." The depart-
ment takes the position despite the provision of
the N.Y. VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW § 510(3)
(b) to the effect that a license may be suspended
or revoked because of the "court commitment of
the holder...." N.Y.C.B.A., MENTAL ILLNESS
AND DUE PROCESS 80 n.35 (1962).
90 Ibid.
!' N.Y. ELECTIONS LAW § 152(6).
92 N.Y.C.B.A., MENTAL ILLNESS AND DUE PROC-
ESS 81 (1962).
t,:i Although the validity of contract would appear
The third and final problem concerns a
patient's right of privacy. Withholding the
hospital record of a mental patient would go
far toward encouraging participation in a
non-compulsory program, 9 ' but complete
privacy appears impossible. First, the pa-
tient's name must be registered with the
hospital and with certain state health agen-
cies. 95 If the New York Committee's Mental
Health Review Service were put into opera-
tion it would likewise be necessary to regis-
ter the patient with the Service in order to
further protect his interests. In addition, a
statement of the patient's name and mental
condition would have to be submitted to
the proper state authorities in connection
with his driving and voting privileges. Fi-
nally, transactions in land must be made
secure from attacks in the chain of title
based on mental incompetency. This might
well require an open list of persons incom-
petent to enter into commercial transactions
to be open to question, a state holding that a
patient may contract away his right of personal
freedom should have no difficulty in holding that
same person may contract away his right to vote.
94 Ross, Hospitalization of the Voluntary Mental
Patient, 53 MICH. L. REV. 353, 363-64 (1955).
95See, e.g., N.Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW § 71,
which requires notification to be given the De-
partment of Mental Hygiene within two days of
the patient's admission.
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or dealings in real property. 96 The New
York Committee makes no recommenda-
tions in this area.
Innovations such as the highly successful
British system will do much to eliminate the
problems which surround voluntary admis-
sions. Limiting detention periods in con-
version statutes, eliminating sterlization
statutes, employing a "capacity test" in both
driving and voting restrictions, while devel-
oping safeguards for the patient's privacy,
all will encourage the mentally ill to seek aid
while protecting their legal rights. By apply-
ing the recommendations of the New York
City Bar Committee considerable progress
will have been made in improving the men-
tal health laws.
Perhaps, in the future, society will see no
difference between a patient entering a men-
tal hospital for treatment of mental illness
and another patient entering a general hos-
pital for cancer or tuberculosis. Perhaps, too,
society will view the mental.patient's need
for isolation as analogous to the need to
isolate the person who has a contagious
disease.
By adopting a program of informal ad-
mission in conjunction with some of the
Committee's recommendations the law will
be better adjusted to the interests of society
by treating mental illness as a disease rather
than a crime.
96 Ross, supra note 94, at 364.
